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ABSTRACT
Several models of the problem of target selection for
field artillery fire as a supporting weapon system to a
maneuver element in a division field environment are pre-
sented in this thesis. The field artillery system, its
capabilities and limitations, as well as, the criteria
utilized by military decision makers to provide timely, accu-
rate, and effective artillery fire support to the maneuver
commander, is covered to familiarize the analyst with the
system to be modeled. A differential equation model using
Lanchester Theory of Combat and the mathematical technique of
optimal control to the target allocation problem is presented,
A second model presented uses an allocation of fire dependent
upon the kill potential and capability of the respective
forces. The kill potential varies with the lethality and
range of the weapon system from that force. A discussion of
the worth of combat units in dynamic combat situations is
also presented. The conclusion reached is that there is a
dire need for more models in the area of target allocation
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop a simplified
mathematical model to gain insight into the best target
selection for field artillery fire as a supporting weapon
system to the division maneuver element. The concentration
of effort will be to develop theoretical models to present
the engagement of combat.
The value of theoretical models to depict any system
can be best expressed by a quote from Clausewitz in his study
on the book, "On War":
"If theory investigates the things that make up war,
if it separates more distinctly that which at first
seems confused, if it explains fully the properties
of the means, if it shows their probable effects, if
it clearly defines the nature of the ends in view,
if it sheds the light of a deliberate critical
observation over the whole field of war then it has
achieved the main object of its task. It then becomes
a guide to whoever wishes to become familiar with war
from books; it everywhere lights up for him the road,
facilitates his progress, educates his judgment, and
keeps him from going astray." [6]
This philosophy on models and theory is as appropriate today
as it was in the 1800 's when Clausewitz said it.
The first attempt at the development of combat models
was in the form of simultaneous differential equations formu-
lated by F. W. Lanchester. Since this development much work
has been accomplished in extending these Lanchester equations
by relaxing one or more of the assumptions. Among some of
these extensions there has been considerable effort devoted
to the area of differential games and control theory depicting

primary maneuver systems supported by secondary weapon sys-
tems. It is from these latter extensions that the author
will model the artillery allocation problem.
In the presentation of any modeling situation the analyst
is faced with the well known analysts* dilemma. On one side,
the model developed can be so close to reality that the model
becomes so detailed and complex that it is not tractable and
therefore yields no meaningful information. On the opposite
side of the picture, the model can be so simplified by
assumptions that the real world situation attempted to be
modeled becomes too far removed from the end product. It is
somewhere in the middle-ground that is the goal of all ana-
lysts, and this will be the case in the modeling of the
artillery problem.
To successfully model any system it takes a great deal
of experience and a thorough knowledge of the system to be
modeled. In conjunction with this idea a detailed discussion
of the inner functions of the artillery system is presented
to the reader as background material.
It is then with this introduction and the desire to add
to the ever increasing models being developed of combat that
this paper is written.

II. THE FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM
A preliminary requirement in the formulation of any
model is a thorough knowledge of the system that the analyst
is attempting to model. A thorough understanding of the
field artillery system requires knowledge of its organizations,
the roles or missions that the artillery is called upon to
perform, its capabilities and limitations, the criteria
used by military decision makers to provide adequate artil-
lery fire to the maneuver commanders, and the environment
in which the artillery conducts operations.
A. ROLE OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM
The general mission of the field artillery in combat is
to:
1. Provide timely, close, and accurate fire support to
the maneuver elements, destroying or neutralizing those
targets that are most likely to jeopardize the accomplishment
of the mission.
2. Add depth to the battlefield by attacking reserves,
command posts, logistical installations, and lines of commu-
nications .
3. Achieve fire superiority over enemy mortars, artil-
lery, and nuclear delivery systems within its area of coverage
and responsibility.
To accomplish the above listed general mission require-
ments the field artillery system must call upon all of those

elements necessary to obtain the desired effect on the target
complex. These elements that make valuable contributions to
yield the desired results on the target as listed in Ref. 1
include:






Fire control and coordination element
Transportation units
B. THE FIELD ARTILLERY TEAM
The elements of the artillery system that the analyst
is most concerned about for combat modeling are the firing
unit or the weapon, which is referred to as the firing battery
the target acquisition element, which is more often thought
of as the forward observer; and the fire control element,
which is denoted as the fire direction center. These are
the primary elements of the artillery team, although to suc-
cessfully accomplish the overall mission, the other five
elements mentioned above contribute their needed support, to
aid the artillery team to place the "steel" on the target.
The functions of the primary elements of the "artillery
team" are:
1. Fire Direction and Control
The fire direction center analyzes incoming informa-
tion from its target acquisition sources, especially its
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forward observers, determines the necessary firing data for
the firing units, and transmits this firing data via the
existing communications to the firing units. The units to




The forward observer detects enemy targets in his
area of responsibility, reports these to the fire direction
center, initiates fire missions, and adjusts fire as required.
Although the forward observer is the eyes of the field artil-
lery team, there are other means of target acquisition such
as, countermortar radars, sound devices, night vision devices,
captured enemy documents, and the like that perform an equally
important role as target acquisition for the artillery.
3. Firing Units
The firing units at platoon, battery, or battalion
level, apply the firing data transmitted by the fire direction
center to the artillery pieces to fire and actually execute
the fire mission.
To successfully attack any target complex to the
requirements of the field commander it requires a concentrated
effort of all the members of this field artillery team.
C. TACTICAL MISSIONS OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY
To yield flexibility and responsiveness to the field
commanders desires the field artillery has available four
standard tactical missions it can assign to its battalions.
Modifications to these four standard missions are possible,
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but these are more generally used only when the intent of
the commander cannot be clearly specified by one of the
four basic missions. The standard missions designate nec-
essary fire support responsibilities among supported and
supporting units in the area of communications, liaison,
zones of fire, observer requirements, responsibility for unit
displacement, response to calls for fire, and responsi-
bilities for planning of artillery fires. These four mis-
sions are listed in Appendix D, in descending order as to
the amount of centralized control retained by the commander;
general support, general support-reinforcing, reinforcing,
and direct support [Ref . 7]
.
Although these tactical missions designate necessary
control for the artillery, there exists a basic requirements
list inherent to each of these assigned tactical missions
that is of considerable importance to the analyst who is
attempting to develop meaningful, tractable models of the
artillery system. These are best identified by two broad
categories, offensive and defensive operations [7].
1. Offensive Operations
Some of the missions that the artillery is required
to perform during offensive operations are:
a. Provide adequate support for the plan of maneuver
of the supported maneuver force.




c. Furnish massed fires throughout the zone of
action of the supported maneuver force.
d. Facilitate future tactical operations.
e. Provide necessary harassing and interdiction
fire.
2 . Defensive Operations
The more common missions that the field artillery is
called upon to execute during defensive operations are:
a. Provide necessary harassing and interdiction
fires to force the enemy into early deployment and to dis-
organize and disrupt his operations.
b. Delay and disorganize the enemy's approach.
c. Disrupt the enemy's attack preparation by effec-
tive counter-preparation fire.
d. Impede the enemy's attack with close defensive
fires in width and depth throughout the zone.
e. Break up the enemy's assault with final protec-
tive fires and barrages
.
f. Limit penetration with on call fires within,
behind, and forward of the forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA)
.
g. Support the counterattack and associated offensive
actions of our force.
These artillery requirements are general in nature.
To accomplish these listed offensive and defensive operations
requirements there must exist a truly effective, artillery
team that is responsive to the commander's wishes providing
13

timely, effective, accurate and continuous supporting fires.
This continuous fire is contingent upon continuous fire
planning of artillery fires on targets of opportunity and
planned targets.
Targets of opportunity are targets which are observed
after the beginning of an operation, whereas planned fires
are preplanned on areas or points for which fire may be
needed to accomplish the overall tactical mission before the
operation begins. These planned fires include a long list
of types of fires such as, scheduled fires, on call fires,
concentrations, barrages, preparations and interdiction
fire to name only a few.
Although planned fires allow normally for sufficient
analysis to properly allocate units and ammunition, effective
fire on targets of opportunity requires proper employment of
intelligence agencies, effective interchange of information
at all levels of command, rapid employment of the most effec-
tive weapon system to engage the target, sufficient ammunition
on hand, proper and efficient action on the part of the artil-
lery team and close and continuing coordination with all
adjacent and concerned tactical units [8].
D. LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY
In accomplishing these varied missions associated with
the field artillery the analyst must also be aware of the




The artillery has the capability to:
a. Shift fires rapidly within a large area and on
a wide front without displacement.
b. Mass fires on one or more targets.
c. Place indirect fire on targets in defilade
positions
.
d. Deliver accurate fire with proper ammunition
under adverse conditions from weapons emplaced laterally
and in depth throughout the zone of action.
e. Place fire on targets from a defilade position.
f. Deliver accurate fires on targets without ad-
justment.
g. Displace rapidly to new positions and employ
artillery units to mass fires when required.
h. Conduct assault fire to effect destruction of
point targets.
i. Conduct direct fire against assaulting troops,




The limitations restricting artillery fire are:
a. Mission effectiveness is considerably reduced
and vulnerability is increased during displacements.
b. Mission effectiveness is considerably reduced
when it is required to engage in close combat with the enemy.





E. ARTILLERY UNITS AVAILABLE AND THEIR CAPABILITIES
To discuss target allocation models in the artillery,
it is essential that the analyst have a thorough knowledge
of the firing units available and their listed capabilities,
as well as their method of employment.
Artillery is employed in great width and depth through-
out the battle area to provide adequate and overall coverage
of the tactical zone. Artillery is classified as light,
medium, heavy, or very heavy [9],
Type Criteria for Classification
light 120mm or less
medium greater than 120mm, but less than 160mm
heavy greater than 160mm, but less than 210mm
very heavy greater than 210mm
The exact positioning of artillery units so as to effec-
tively influence the outcome of the battle is dependent on
such factors as terrain, combat situation, actions of sup-
ported unit, tactical mission, and other related factors.
The maximum range of artillery weapon systems most com-
monly employed to support maneuver forces directly are listed
below from Ref. 9 to provide an idea of artillery capabilities.
Weapon Maximum Range ( me te r s
)
105mm(towed or SP) ,M108 11,500
155mm(towed or SP),M109 14,600
8 inch SP, MHO 16,800
175mm gun, M107 32,700
*4.2 inch mortar 5,650
115mm multiple launcher, M91 10,600




These artillery type units normally located at Division,
Corps, or Army level are capable of supporting operations in
varying type terrains and climates. These variations include
the flat, hot and dry desert; the humid and wet areas of
swamp land and jungles; as well as the high climates of the
mountain country. Performance under various degrees of
mobility to include mechanized or non-mechanized operations,
water or canal operations as in Southeast Asia, and air-
mobile operations with the smaller and lighter weapons is
another of the assets of the field artillery. Further the
artillery is flexible to fight under any environment or
situation, and it is therefore important that the analyst be
specific in his model formulation to state what the situation
is and what the assumptions are for each model.
F. ARTILLERY FIRE PLANNING
To provide immediate, responsive, timely, accurate and
effective artillery fire support to the field commander of
the maneuver elements the artillery must conduct continuous
fire planning. This fire planning must be effective at all
levels of command from the battery size unit up to Army level.
Fire planning is accomplished simultaneously at all levels
with a current updating of information as often as is pos-
sible or necessary. Figures 1 and 2 depict the fire planning
channels for company, brigade, division artillery, and corps
artillery levels. To familiarize the reader with what normally
transpires in a fire planning process the discussion will

















































In situations involving the direct support battalions
in support of an infantry brigade continuous fire planning
is the key. As is shown in Figure 1 the direct support
battalion artillery S-3, operations officer, receives de-
tailed fire plans and requests from each of his liaison
officers located with their supported infantry battalions.
These liaison officers in turn compiled their plans from fire
requests from the supported infantry units along with planned
targets in the area of responsibility of each of the forward
observers located with each of the three infantry line com-
panies in the battalion. The forward observer located with
the infantry company is the senior artillery advisor to the
small unit company commander advising him on the availability
of field artillery fire to best accomplish his mission. The
liaison officer likewise advises and recommends to the
infantry battalion commanders the best way to employ or use
the artillery fire available to support the battalion mission.
In addition, the liaison officer collects and consolidates
the target lists from each of his forward observers for for-
warding to the artillery battalion operations officer, S-3.
Then the S-3 takes all the liaison officers fire plans and
consolidated requests along with target information generated
from the direct support artillery battalion intelligence
section, the brigade liaison officer, adjacent units, and
other intelligence agencies available to him and he compiles
a typical artillery fire plan. To construct an artillery




1. Plot the fire units and their ranges and traverse
limits on an overlay to be affixed to the planning map.
2. Plot targets and designate other targets appropriate.
3. Resolve any duplication of fires.
4. List the targets received from the planning sources
on the target list.
5. Select the targets to be scheduled and the method of
attack, using the appropriate columns of the target list.
6. Prepare an artillery fire plan table for those targets
to be fired in accordance with a time schedule; for example,
preparations fires, series of targets, and schedule of fires.
7. Prepare the written portion of the fire plan.
These general procedures in preparation of an artillery
fire plan are accomplished basically the same way at all
artillery levels. Reference 10 illustrates a completed fire
plan with all its annexes, appendices, and tabs.
Once the S-3 is satisfied that the fire plan will best
accomplish the fire mission of the field commander, he sub-
mits the fire plan for the brigade commander's signature and
approval while at the same time he forwards a copy of the plan
to the division artillery for information. Upon completion of
this activity with the approval of the commander the fire plan
is published and submitted to all units concerned for
implementation
.
At the division level the division artillery S-3 prepares
the artillery fire plan to support the division, based on the
division commander's concept of the operation. The objective
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of the division artillery planning is coordinated artillery
fire support for the entire division area. A division artil-
lery fire plan is initiated by planning fires for the division
general support artillery and by planning fires on targets
requested by, or beyond the range of the direct support
battalions, and by planning fire on targets of interest to
the division zone as a whole. Fire plans of the direct sup-
port artillery are augmented when necessary by general
support and reinforcing fires, which are integrated with the
fire plan of the division artillery. Targets which are in-
capable of limited interference with the division level plan
of maneuver are sent to the S-2, intelligence section, of the
direct support artillery battalion for consideration for attack
on the target at that level. Targets out of range of division
artillery are sent to the next higher headquarters, Corps
artillery. Targets unsuitable for attack by artillery are
sent to the division fire support coordination element for
possible attack by other fire support means, such as, tactical
air, naval gunfire, or other means. All counter-battery type
targets are sent to division and to corps artillery for attack
consideration. It is only at these two levels that counter-
battery programs can be coordinated for subordinate units.
It should be obvious that fire planning is conducted con-
currently at all levels of artillery fire planning. It does
not cease when a formal fire plan is published and dissemi-
nated. Additions, deletions, and necessary updating must be
transmitted to appropriate headquarters when the need arises
or as changes occur.
22

All targets or potential targets are examined and ana-
lyzed to determine their military importance, priority of
attack, and capabilities for available weapons to attack.
The length of time and the amount of detail in making a
target analysis depends on the amount of information avail-
able concerning the target, the means available for attack,
the degree of necessary coordination required, and the
urgency for attack. Planned targets receive a more detailed
analysis than targets of opportunity. Even though targets of
opportunity receives only a cursory mental calculation in
order that timely, accurate, and effective fire may be brought
to bear on the fleeting target, the same considerations run
through the mind of the operations officer as were considered
for the planned target.
The basic consideration in making a target analysis is
the concept of the operation as announced by the commander.
Firepower must be integrated properly with the scheme of
maneuver. Standard operating procedures in the units, as well
as local commander's policies must be adhered to by the target
analyst in his analysis.
The military importance of a target is determined by the
threat the target represents. The importance of the target is
valid only at the level of force at which the analysis is con-
ducted. A guide for priorities in ascertaining military
importance as extracted from Ref. 8 is listed below:
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Priority Target ' s Capability
I Prevent the execution of the plan of action
II Immediate interference with plan of action
III Ultimate interference with plan of action
IV Limited interference with plan of action
In addition to these listed priorities there exists a
list of criteria for precedence of fires, since rarely is
there sufficient fire support available to undertake fire on
all targets. Characteristics to be considered for target
engagement are as extracted from Ref. 8 indicated below:
Nature of target - Composition, size, shape,
vulnerability, mobility, and recuperability
.
Location - Closeness to friendly troops,
proximity to area commanders desires to damage.
Terrain and Weather - Vulnerability of target.
Visibility of target and effect of attack by fire
support means.
Desired Effect - Neutralization, destruction or
harassment.
Once the priorities and precedence are established the
weapon system to produce the desired effect must be chosen.
Considerations here include desired effect, troop safety, and
time requirements.
Subsequently the desired method of attack is established.
The desired method of attack is based on the mean point of
impact determined by the target size and shape, the density
of fire, the duration of fire which is dictated by the ammuni'
tion available and the desired effect, and if surprise or non
surprised fire is desired since fire effectiveness can be
improved if fire without adjustment is used.
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Finally after fire is delivered the final step is target
assessment. This can be accomplished by information sources
such as target acquisition agencies that identified the
target initially, imagery interpretation, inspection of the
area after capture, prisoner reports, or captured documents.
Whichever source provides the needed results in the particular
situation is the one chosen.
Pertinent data from the assessment reports not only give
the S-3 immediate indications where to change the impact of
fire, but in addition when properly analyzed the assessment
can determine comparative effectiveness of artillery weapons,
techniques, and ammunition effects in the attack of target
complexes of varied hardness.
G. GENERAL COMMENTS
It has been previously stated and emphasized several times
that artillery fire must be timely
,
accurate , and effective .
This suggests to both the artilleryman and the analyst
that there must exist a sense of urgency on the artillery
team. Artillery fire that is late is just as ineffective as
artillery fire that was inaccurate or not delivered at all.
Therefore every element of the artillery team must be totally
responsive to the supported maneuver elements requirements.
In a world of fast moving, complex technology and in-
creased mobility, artillery fire to be effective must provide
adequate fire in both volume and proper type to provide the
desired results in the target area. A failure to accomplish
this will result in a failure to accomplish the mission and
a loss of the objective.
25

Finally, if the fire is timely accurate and effective,
but there does not exist sufficient or adequate detection
devices for target acquisition, again the artillery will
fail to provide the commander with needed supporting fires.
With the ultimate objective of the artillery in mind,
that is to deliver accurate, timely, and effective fire-
power in support of the maneuver elements in order to inflict
a maximum of casualties and to destroy the enemies will be to
fight, it is then the purpose of this thesis to hopefully
contribute or to extend the already growing volume of models
depicting the problem of target allocation of artillery fire




As it was previously emphasized, model formulation of a
real world problem requires the analyst to specify the
circumstances and conditions under which the model is to be
considered. It is the object then to list the conditions for
modeling the target allocation of field artillery fire by
describing the tactical situation in the division area.
A. LEVEL OF COMBAT
According to military tacticians and strategists there
exists three main levels of combat and these are low, medium,
and high intensity warfare. Low intensity warfare is con-
sidered to be equivalent to the type of warfare which is
presently being engaged in or conducted in Southeast Asia.
Medium intensity warfare is of the caliber conducted in the
past two world wars and in Korea. Finally, all out nuclear
warfare is classified as high intensity warfare. Most dis-
cussions by military planners and analysts are generated
around tactics and strategy involving medium intensity war-
fare, and such will be the case for the discussion presented
here
.
B. UNIT SIZE IN MODEL
In considering medium intensity conflict in discussing
the target allocation problem, several levels of tactical
areas can be presented ranging from the squad to field army
levels. It is strongly felt that the field artillery
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allocation problem could best be exemplified at the division
level where the salient points could readily be depicted for
analysis. A typical infantry division will be presented for
both the friendly (X - force) and the enemy (Y - force)
forces composed basically of infantry as the primary force
and the artillery as the secondary or supporting force.
Although the infantry division is composed of forces of other
types; such as, armor, engineers, and necessary logistical
support elements, to avoid detracting from the problem at
hand these other divisional elements will not be considered,
but they will be left as a further area of extension for other
analysts so inclined. In addition, other supporting secondary
forces as naval gunfire, tactical air, and nuclear means will
likewise be disregarded for the above mentioned reasons.
C. WEAPON SYSTEMS AVAILABLE
Weapon systems available for the division forces will
include a direct fire weapon (could be considered an M-14 or
of similar caliber) with known characteristics and capabil-
ities. Weapons for the X and Y forces will be different and
this will be characterized by the kill coefficients used in
the model. Although it would not be an insurmountable problem
to consider elements of the infantry forces armed with different
weapons, it would be uneconomical to do so in this paper.
The secondary system or the artillery in the division will
be typical of a normal infantry division artillery, in that it
will be composed of three (3) - 155mm artillery battalions,

each with three (3) firing batteries of 6 howitzers; and
one (1) 155-8 inch battalion, composed of three (3)
batteries of 155mm with six (6) howitzers each, and one (1)
8 inch battery of four (4) guns. In addition, to signify
other artillery, non-divisional, 8 inch battalions composed
of three (3) batteries of 4 guns each, will be in general
support. The opposing artillery will be made up of a similar
structure but with different weapons of different
characteristics
.
Each of the above mentioned units will have the range
characteristics mentioned in Section II, E. Opposing force
artillery ranges although not listed will be considered of
equal quality.
NOTE: It should be realized that targets normally attacked
by other forces to include higher caliber artillery not found
at division level or tactical air, are to be considered
suitably attacked and annihilated and therefore exogenous to
the situation and therefore exogenous to the model.
D. ARTILLERY ASSIGNED MISSIONS
Typical missions for divisional and non-divisional artil-
lery units are as shown in Appendix D. Specifically for the
155mm units the mission of direct support is established and
for the 155/ 8 inch composite battalion and the non-
divisional battalions a mission of general support is as-
signed. These assignments are those normally established,




E. CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE DISPOSITION
1. Current Force Structure
Forces for both sides will be structured with
three (3) infantry brigades designated X. and Y. for the
friendly and enemy forces respectively, where
Xj - represents the friendly brigade where




- represents the friendly supporting artillery
where k = 1,2,3 signifying 155mm, 155/8 inch,
8 inch battalions respectively.
Y^ - represents the opposing brigades where
j = 1,2,3 signifying the 1st, 2d, and 3rd
brigades respectively.
Y - represents the opposing artillery where
k = 1,2,3 signifying similar caliber artil-




A division area is normally constituted with two
brigades up front and one in reserve. This tactical deploy-
ment is utilized down to and including squad level; that is,
two elements up one in reserve. The configuration of this
type tactic is depicted in Figs. 3, 4, and 5.
The model discussion will concentrate on Fig. listing
the division area with the smallest infantry unit considered
to be a brigade and the smallest artillery unit will be the
supporting field artillery unit, the battalion.
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'o^axd-Jid^cje , of Battle Area
1st Brigade 2d Brigade








Figure 3. Division Area (2 Brigades up and 1 back)
31










Figure 4. Brigade Area (2 Battalions up and 1 Back)
'orw'arcl .Edge of Battle Area
1st Company 2d Company
Reserve Company
*Figure 5. Battalion Area (2 Companies up and 1 Back)
* Notice Artillery supports brigades, not battalions.
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For this disposition of forces the 155mm artillery
battalions of the division will be assigned missions as
follows: the two artillery battalions supporting the two
brigades on line will be direct support on order general
support should their respective brigade be placed in reserve;
the other 155mm artillery battalion normally in direct
support of its brigade will be general support on order direct
support to its brigade when it is committed in the battle,
and the 155mm/8 inch battalion and the non-divisional artil-
lery will be general support of the division operations.
The mission of general support reinforcing is also a frequent
choice in situations like this, but general support gives the
commander more centralized control as was indicated in Section
II, C.
Individual batteries on some isolated occasions may
receive separate missions, but this is the exception rather
than the rule.
The exact positioning of the artillery forces in
support of the division is such as to follow the artillery
rule of thumb of locating battery units such that two-thirds
of the range of the unit is extended in front of the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) , and to facilitate coverage of
the entire division area while a sufficient amount of over-
lapping fires exists.
The infantry brigades are positioned with a figure
of 1000 meters per company for defense and adjacent units
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with interlocking fire. This figure of 1000 meters is
flexible to adjust to existing terrain configuration.
F. TERRAIN LIMITATIONS
The terrain for the problem is considered to be normal
rolling flat terrain and standard vegetation with no hin-
drance to troop movement or indirect fire support for either
force. Forces on both sides make use of existing cover and
concealment and are so deployed to the best utilization of
existing terrain.
G. GENERAL
This then is the situation for which the models of field
artillery allocation will depict. It should be noted that
the number of infantry brigades or supporting artillery bat-
talions or types could easily be altered by simply extending
the use of subscripts or superscripts to facilitate one's
purpose. In addition, all the division's forces could be
included with kill coefficients compatible to the type of
weapon system the force utilized, but for this case it would
add unnecessary cluttering and difficulty to the discussion of
the problem to be attacked. The reason then to limit the
type of forces for discussion and to list specific type units
is to facilitate the problem discussion and to facilitate
ease of model presentation.
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IV. MODELING THE SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND OF SOME THEORETICAL MODELS
The object now is to model this tactical situation pre-
sented in Section III to yield some useful information on the
target allocation problem in the field artillery. Some theo-
retical models are already in existence that have been found
to be consistent with established facts of warfare. It is
from these existing theoretical models developed by notable
analysts that the author will try to model this artillery
allocation problem. With the idea of extending already
developed theoretical models, it is then the purpose of this
section to present a background of some of these basic theo-
retical models of combat.
The first attempt at the development of combat models
was by F. W. Lanchester in the form of differential equations
[11]. This formulation of differential equations by Lanchester
is commonly referred to in the literature as Lanchester equa-
tions. A brief review of Lanchester 1 s development of the
well known Linear and Square Laws and their solution is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
Since the development of the Lanchester Equations many
valuable contributions to the field have been accomplished by
extending the equations simply by relaxing one or more of the
assumptions used by Lanchester. A recent comprehensive paper
by Seth Bonder [19] has summarized the works of analysts
responsible for these extensions. In Ref. 20 a particularly
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noteworthy contribution is presented by Herbert K. Weiss,
in his noteworthy treatment of relative movement of forces,
combat between small forces in the presence of weapons with
large areas of effectiveness and finally combat among
heterogeneous forces. The problem of target assignment is
covered when the forces are heterogeneous.
Weiss, in Ref. 21, used Lanchester equations for a combat
model in a problem which he formulated as a differential game.
The tactic that Weiss has analyzed is the selection of tar-
gets to be attacked. This tactic is incorporated in his
model which includes two forces in contact where each force
consists of a primary and a secondary system. The two sys-
tem game could be infantry and the supporting artillery. A
brief review of this game and Weiss 's solution is presented
in Appendix B.
In Ref. 5 Brackney extended Lanchester equations to in-
clude the concept of search during combat for the individual
combatants of the opposing force. This development is made
with the assumption that the distribution of a combat force,
over an area held by that force, is uniformly random.
Lanchester 's assumptions for his square law are also present.
A summary of Brackney ' s work is not presented here, but it is
available to the interested reader in Ref. 5.
Further, in Ref. 15, Col. Thomas S. Schreiber developed
a model using differential equations, which enables the effi-
ciency of the intelligence and command and control systems to
quantitatively related to the fire power and numerical
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strength of a force. He presents numerical results which
indicate that an increase in the target acquisition capa-
bility can be equivalent to an increase in force strength.
This implies that the combat effectiveness of a unit can be
increased significantly by improving the unit's target
acquisition capability.
More recent extensions of combat theory are presented
by J. Taylor in Refs. 16 and 17 in the area of target selec-
tion for combat between heterogeneous forces. He has
examined several simplified idealized combat situations for
the purpose of interpretation to yield general principles
to serve as stepping stones for further studies in field
experimentation and model simulation.
B. MODEL 1
With this background of theoretical models and ideas of
combat using Lanchester Theory and other analysts extensions
in related areas to the theory, it is then the purpose to
model the problem of target allocation of field artillery in
a supporting role of an infantry element in the stated divi-
sion tactical situation. The forces of both friendly and
enemy sides are both static with neither side in an attack
posture as in Fig. 6.
Assumptions for this initial model are indicated below:
1. Target acquisition rate is greater than firing rate.
2. Unlimited ammunition available.





























Figure 6. Tactical Force Disposition
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4. Ground forces in primary force composed of infantry
elements (armor, etc., not considered to aide in problem
simplification)
.
5. Allocation of fires by operations officer, S-3, is
considered to be rational and in conjunction with listed
artillery priorities and procedures.
6. Artillery weapons do not have to adjust fire on
targets, they are considered registered and they can shift
fires inside the division area without limitation.
7. Replacement rate of troops is not considered.
8. No operational losses to either side like accidents,
dysentery, and AWOL ' s are included.
9. Infantry can only inflict casualties on infantry;
while the artillery can inflict casualties on either.
10. Problem is time specified.
11. Infantry fires aimed fire and obeys square law; artil-
lery fires area fire and obeys linear law conditions.
12. Infantry elements in reserve cannot inflict casualties
until committed since they are out of range, but they do
possess a kill coefficient and kill potential.
13. Targets normally attacked by other forces other than
those considered, for example higher artillery or tactical
air, are so attacked and considered exogenous to the model.
Certainly with these assumptions and with the knowledge of
already developed theoretical models, this situation would
fit nicely into the theory developed by H. K. Weiss, listed
in Appendix B. with extensions as applied by J. Taylor in
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Ref. 16. Using this approach and noting that assumption 9
alters the state equations to include casualties imposed by
the infantry, the problem can be formulated as a time spec-
ified problem, where the objective for the X - force is to
minimize losses while maximizing the oppositions losses. The
problem is a one-sided version problem evaluated for spec-
ified y ' s for the Y - force to determine the $'s for the X -
force
.
The payoff to X in the stated objective function is
minimize p[X 1 (T) + X 2 (T) + X 3 (T)] + q[X 1 (T) + X 2 (T) + X 3 (T)]-
(1) r[Y 1 (T) + Y 2 (T) + Y 3 (T)] + s [Y 1 (T) + Y 2 (T) + Y 3 (T)]


































































where x = x (T) + x (T) , front line brigades12 3
x = xJ(T) + x2 (T) + x (T) , artillery fire support units
x, = x, (T) , reserve force brigade
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with the same notation for the opposing forces but using
y's.
a,, a - represent the kill rate coefficients of the y
infantry and artillery forces.
b, f b - represent the kill rate coefficients of the x
infantry and artillery forces.
p,q, -r, -s - represent the weighting factors assigned to
the surviving forces by the x commander.
<J> . and V. - represent the proportion of artillery fire
allocated for the x force and y force directed
at the other force.
¥. are specified, and _ ¥
.
, $ . _ 1
where V = (1-4^-^) and $ 3 = (l-^-^)
since a prescribed duration time T is being used then




(t=T) = q x2 = x2
p (t=T) = p and at time = 0,x = x 3
P 4
(t=T) = - r Y l
= Y l
P 5


























and the adjoint equations are
(9) Pl - " Hj = Pl a2^1 " ?4b l







- % = P 3a2^3
(12) P"4 = " i^ = P 4 b 2 X2*l + ?l a l








U4) P6 = " Ifj = P6b 2 X2*3
Since the adjoint equations now depend on the state
variables, the resulting two boundary value problem does not
readily possess a solution obtainable by elementary methods.
However, the above model is believed to be a realistic model
for deployment of the artillery supporting system against
ground forces, since the individual soldiers are not engaged
as point targets [16]. As Taylor states in Ref. 16 in his
discussion of a second extension from Weiss [21] , that in
cases of partial information that the supporting unit is in-
formed about the general areas in which the opposing infantry
are located, but is not informed about the consequences of
its own fire. This still applies to assumption three of the
model. In agreement with Taylor [16], it is more realistic
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to assume that artillery units would be more concerned about
large kill potential weapon systems and further that ground
force intelligence would be greater concerned with troop
concentrations rather than the individual combatant.
In the model it should be noted that the worth of the
forces to the x commander at any time t varied over time up
to the assigned values specified at time T; namely, p, q, -r,
and -s respectively. This value of forces is indicated by
the associated adjoint equations and dual variables. This
dynamic combat force potential is more readily demonstrated
for the reader in Appendix C in an explanation utilizing a
simpler two (2) force model expressed in terms of the
Lanchester Square Law. The discussion in Appendix C possesses
an intuitive incite to the changing worth of combat units indi-
cating mathematically that a loss of forces to the commander
early in the battle is a greater loss than later in the
battle, since not only does the commander lose the fighting
unit, but the casualty inflicting power of the unit as well.
This initial model further utilizes a fixed kill coeffi-
cient which is not easily accepted by tacticians and planners
who realize that in reality for a given weapon system the
kill rate is primarily a function of the weapons range and
lethality at that range, although other conditions like troop
training, morale, weather conditions, and many other difficult





Now if the assumptions mentioned in Model I remain the
same, but the analyst considers data accumulated from past
history of war casualties as shown in Fig. 7 , extracted from
Ref. 18, the first model can be simplified. Since
% CASUALTIES
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Figure 7. Relative Percent Casualties Produced
by Small Arms and Fragmentation Weapon Systems.
approximately 80 percent of the casualties produced are the
result of supporting weapon systems, then for the same time
specified problem, the casualties inflicted by the primary
infantry force can be considered to be insignificant compared
to those casualties produced by the supporting secondary
system, the field artillery.
Further, if a variable kill coefficient is introduced as
a function of lethality, 1, and a function of range, r, as
presented by Bonder [11], then the objective function remains
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and the adjoint system of equations is now
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(27) p 6 = p 6 b 2 (l /r )x 2 $ 3
Since the adjoint equations remain dependent on the state
variables, the resulting two boundary problem does not
readily possess a solution by elementary techniques. The
model may still be examined qualitatively.
The model now contains allocation factors of artillery
fire dependent upon the size of the opposing forces and the
kill capability of that opposing force. This allocation of
fire corresponds to the criteria of artillery fire planning
presented on priorities and precedence established in Section
II-F, where the artillery operations officer, acting ration-
ally, determines what units to engage depending on the forces
threat to the accomplishment of the mission. Certainly those
targets yielding an immediate threat to the accomplishment of
the mission must be engaged, as is the case in the model when
the proportion of artillery fire $., directed at the opposing
forces is related to the size of that force and its respec-
tive kill capability.
The varying kill potential of the forces dependent on
the forces lethality and range can be extracted from figures
as in Fig. 8 for the position at a particular instant of time,
This weapon system kill coefficient is in consonance with the
idea of Weapons Fire Power Potential (WFPP) developed by
Technical Operations Incorporated Combat Operations Research
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WFPP - is defined as the product of the lethality of
a projectile delivered by a weapon system
times the number of rounds fired during a
given period.
Lethality measures were developed for area, point, and anti-
armor weapon systems. The parameters used for development of
this WFPP included available armament, ammunition types, the
tactical situation, vulnerability posture, and target types.
Factors excluded from the derivation were intelligence;
mobility; command, control, and communications; service sup-
port; and morale, esprit de corps, and training. Fire power
potential for area type weapons was defined as the product of
the jriean lethal area of a round and the number of projectiles
fired during a given period as provided by the estimate of the
expenditure of ammunition. Further the lethality of one round
of ammunition for point fire weapons was developed by estab-
lishing a relationship between the point fire weapons producing
capability and that of area fire weapons employed against
personnel. To accomplish this, three assumptions were used.
First, it was assumed that the casualty producing potential of
a single round of ball ammunition had not changed significantly
since World War II (WWII data was used) ; second, the lethality
of a round of ball ammunition was assumed to be a function of
its casualty producing capability; and third, the potential
of any given round of ball ammunition was assumed to be the
same regardless which weapon fired it. With this a feasible
relative ranking was established since compatible lethal
areas had been developed for both area and point fire family
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weapons. Finally combining of WFPP was considered possible
since WFPP had been defined as the total maximum lethality
brought to bear by the weapon system or systems over a period
of time on the target. Actual computation and procedure of
the calculation of the WFPP is not included since the reference
where the above unclassified information was extracted is
classified. The interested reader is directed to Ref. 18.
The kill coefficients as a function of range and lethality
may further include in the function a troop movement rate
negative or positive to account for retrograde or attack
movement of forces, to pertain to other than static situations.
Generally, this will further complicate the model and make it
more difficult to use an elementary solution technique, but
it would make the model more general.
Further, the commanders worth for a given force changing
with time, as expressed through the dual variables in the
adjoint equations, agrees with reality in the sense that as
a battle progresses in fast changing tactical situations, the
force commander's value for a given unit surely may vary
dependent on the enemy force strength, the mission assigned,
or both.
D. GENERAL COMMENTS
Neither model presented included operational losses since
the models presented already are complicated enough to solve
or analyze already. If the interest is to include operational
losses, this can be added to the model using the approach
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presented in Ref. 1. The results obtained without the
operational loss consideration would be a little optimistic,
since the number of survivors without this consideration may
be increased.
Excluded also from the models were troop replacement,
troop training, and troop morale since these were considered
beyond the scope of this paper.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The primary interest of this paper was to present an
extension to the existing models already developed for target
allocation of secondary weapon systems, in particular, the
field artillery weapon system as the supporting arms to the
infantry maneuver force in the division area. The field
artillery system was presented to familiarize the reader
with the systems capabilities and limitations, with directed
emphasis on the fire planning operations which direct the
artillery to the actual target engagement.
A basic one-sided model of the posed division tactical
situation of two opposing division size forces consisting of
a primary system of three infantry brigades and a secondary
system of field artillery, both direct support and general
support, was presented using extended Lanchester theory with
a constant kill coefficient for the included forces. This
model was further extended to use a variable kill coefficient
as a function of lethality and range, with both models set up
for a specified time, T. Both models resulted in systems of
differential equations with solutions not readily obtainable
by elementary methods, however the models presented include
a more realistic kill coefficient, dependent upon lethality
and range.
Further the troop worth to the unit commander was
presented through the use of the duals in the adjoint system
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of equations. This implies that a soldier lost earlier in
the battle was a greater loss to the commander since the
soldier and his casualty inflicting power are both loss for
a longer time.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The area of target allocation of secondary weapons systems
is wide open to expansion and extensions of already developed
theoretical models. Particular emphasis is needed in the
area of more tractable models closer depicting reality of
supporting systems, as the field artillery, to include ammu-
nition constraints, force replacements, troop morale, logis-
tical and transportation interaction, target acquisition, and
stochastic behavior. Models considering some of these areas
are already appearing in the field, but only in elementary
stages. The field artillery, as well as other supporting sys-
tems and other associated fields of allocation, has a need for
concentrated work in models of this type to help solve the
problem of allocation to enhance their contribution in the





The Lanchester simultaneous differential equations and
their solutions which are probably the first attempt at the
development of combat models are presented below as a review
as extracted from Refs. 12 and 20.
The Square Law is applicable for situations utilizing
aimed fire and is developed under the assumption that:
(1) Two forces are engaged in a firefight when each unit
or each force is within weapon range of all units of the other
force.
(2) Units on each force are homogeneous but the kill rate
of the opposing force may be different.
(3) Each firing unit or force is well aware of the loca-
tion of the opposing units so that when a target is killed,
the forces fire is shifted to another target.
(4) Units fire is uniformly distributed over the area
in which the surviving forces are located.
The opposing forces are designated as odd and even with
the following notation:
x,, x~ = number of surviving units (men) on the even or




= initial strength of forces.
p = single shot probability than an even weapon
will kill an odd man.
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r21 ~~ rate of fire of even weapons against odd units.
The Lanchester equations are:
dx.
'1
Po 1 r o T X -dt ^21 "21 "2 '
dx
2
at" p i2 r i2 x i
The solution was obtained by integrating over time and
then equating the results to yield
2 2 2 2
P21 r21X2 P 12 r 12 X l " P21 r21 X20 " P 12 r 12 X10 '







where the ratio of losses squared is indirectly proportional
to the effectiveness of the weapons. In situations where the
Square Law applies the equations demonstrate that concentration
of force is advantageous and it warns against almost certain
defeat to the force which commits its forces piecemeal.
The Linear Law is applicable for modeling situations in
which forces would use area fire, such as artillery or other
fire support systems. The first two assumptions of the Square
Law apply again along with the assumptions that
(1) Each firing unit is aware only of the general area
in which the opposing units are located and they fire into
this area without knowledge of the results of their fire.
(2) Fire from survivor units is uniformly distributed
over the area in which the opposing forces are located.
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The probability of opposing units killing each other is







= areas in which odd and even forces are located,
ae^ ae
2








lPA12 ~ effectiveness coefficient of even against odd.
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The solution obtained by integrating over time and equating
results yield
Si " %2 = "V™ ' PA12 X"






The ratio of losses under the Linear Law are indirectly
proportional to the weapons effectiveness coefficients and
there is no advantage to be gained by concentrating forces.
The solutions of the Lanchester equations represent
average values. The equations are an example of a
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deterministic model in that the outcome (rate of attrition)
directly result from specified force sizes and kill coeffi-
cients which are the initial conditions.
Lanchester's Square Law and Linear Law can be modified
by the addition of probability theory. The equations can be
applied to areas where theoretical and statistical investi-
gations can lead to useful results. However, the analyst
must bear the limitations of the original equations, when
they are put to use
.
The equations depart from reality in the areas listed
below. Many extensions have already been presented by re-
laxing the assumptions used in the original equations.
(1) Each unit is within range of all enemy units and
that kill probability is not a function of range but it is
constant.
(2) All units on both forces are homogeneous and there-
fore are not considering the fact that opposing units may
consist of infantry, artillery, armor, tactical air, naval
forces, etc.
(3) No provision is made to incorporate intensities of
combat into the situation.
(4) There is no allocation for tactical decisions to be
made by the commanders for employment of forces.
(5) Random events of probability theory are excluded
from the existing equations.




EXAMPLE OF MODEL USING LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
One of the ways in which the Lanchester equations depart
from reality was item (4) as in Appendix A which states that
there was no provision for tactical decisions by the commander
Weiss [21] did in fact use a valid analysis in his model that
provided for decisions by the commander. The tactic that
Weiss has analyzed is the selection of targets to be attacked.
This approach is incorporated in his model which includes two
forces in contact where each force consists of a primary
system and a secondary system. The primary system is maneu-
ver forces such as infantry or armor and the secondary system
can be thought of as field artillery or tactical air.
The battle as a function of time can be depicted by
Fig. 9.











k 12 X l " $k 32 X 3
dx~
air - (1-*» k 43x 4
dx.
XT - - (1 -*> k 34 X 3
where





Figure 9. Primary and Secondary Weapon Systems
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X 3' X 4
= t*ie numi:)er °f secondary weapons (artillery
or air) for odd or even at time t.
kj_ j = rate at which the ith weapon can kill the
jth weapon.
¥, $ = the fraction of surviving units of the 4,3
type directed at weapons systems of the 1,2
type.
Optimum tactics are determined, using the above model of
Weiss' s, and the effects on force composition are also
determined depending upon the weapon range, cost, and per-
formance parameters
.
The problem becomes one of choosing the proper (V , <f>) as
a function of time. Weiss further stipulates that
k , = k,
2
= 0. Here Weiss is stating that each sides primary
system is overshadowed by a powerful secondary system to the
point where the primary system is insignificant. This implies
that the outcome of the engagement will be decided by the
secondary system before the effects of the primary system
becomes significant. Weiss solved this problem by assuming
that y and $, the allocation variables, would only take on
the values of and 1 and they would remain constant until
termination of the battle.
Weiss further considered the value of supporting weapon
system in the paper. This implies that the weapon system is
one that has an area of effectiveness rather than point
effectiveness. However, the Lanchester equations used in
the model are those of the Square Law or aimed fire. If the
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Linear Law had been used the model would have been too
complex for solution. The model indicates results that may
be examined in greater detail by a working model in the form





The worth of combat units in dynamic combat situations
can be vividly demonstrated through the use of a simple com-
bat model using the Lanchester Square Law discussed in
Appendix A.
Consider a combat situation consisting of two opposing
forces X and Y each inflicting casualties upon the other with
kill coefficients b and a respectively.





(2c) S£ = - b xdt D









= a P l
If we use the vector notation below then equations lc,














(7c) Pl dT +p 2 dT=Pl (-^ + P 2 ( "bx)
(8c)
dp dp
x dt" + Y dt~
= x (bp
2
) + y (ap l }
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hence by combining (7c) and (8c)
d •*" "*
or g- CX • P) =
which implies that X • P = constant,
or p 1




(t) + y(t) p 2 (t) = x(T) px (T) + y(T) p (T) = V,
where V represents the value of the engagement, and p and
P2 ,
the dual variables (tangential variables) are
< llc
> Pi - Is
3 V(12c) p„ = 7— , the gradients of value of the engagement.
But this is the same approach used by G. Bliss (1876-
1951) [3, 13] in developing range tables for correcting artil-
lery fire due to abnormal air densities, weights of
projectiles, winds and other factors shortly after World War
I. The p's (dual variables) may be thought of as the tangen-
tial coordinates (line coordinates) of the trajectory of the
battle represented by equations lc and 2c, that is, x = x(t)
and y = y(t) , the solution of lc and 2c defines a curve in
the x,y plane. The duality of Euclidean geometry (after
adding the ideal point at infinity) states that it is possible
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to represent a curve either as a sequence of points (point
coordinates) or and envelop of tangents (line coordinates),
when the points are transformed by the transposed (dual)
matrix of transformation. It should be noted that a linear
differential equation can be considered as the limit of the
linear equation.
The condition X*P = constant has an interesting and
important interpretation. Consider a battle lasting a
specified length of time, T. Hence
(lie) x(t) p
x
(t) + y(t) p 2 (t) = x(T) p x (T) + y(T) ?2 (T)
as in equation 10c.
If at time t the x commander had Ax(t) less troops, then
this would cause the x commander to have less troops at the
end of the battle and the y force to have more. In fact, the
p's (duals) tell us how much, which can be seen below:
(12c) [xCt) - Ax(t)] Pl (t) + y(t) p 2 (t) = [x(T) - Ax (T) ] P;L (T)
+ [y(T) + Ay(T) ]p 2 (T)
combining lie and 12c
(13c) Ax(t) p
x
(t) = Ax(T) p
x
(T) - Ay(T) p 2 (T)
if p,(T) = 1 and p (T) = -1, it is obvious why the p's are





(t) = Ax(T) + Ay(T)
The variable p, (t) indicates the effect of the loss of one
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X soldier at time t would have on the outcome of the battle.
Expressing the value of the engagement, V, in terms of sur-
viving soldiers, it becomes apparent that
Pl (t) = §£ (t) and p 2 (t) = |2 (t) .
Bliss's idea for the development of air density corrections
for the artillery range tables was similar.
The underlying methematical structure used here (duality)
manifests itself in many of the modern operations research
optimization tools. Recall that it was shown for
->-
->
dX + , dP _±
_. = AX and ^ = - AP
that X»P = constant. The finite dimensional analogue of this
relationship is for
-*-* T * >
Ax = b and A y — c
where the following must occur,
y • b = c • x.
When this is extended to non-negative variables for
Ax = b and A y — c with x — ,
i
then the following must be true
y • b — C X
The latter relationships may then be developed to yield
many Linear Programming theory results. For example, an





-r >A x = b and x —
,







- C - 0,
which in Linear Programming literature is expressed,
Z .
-C . - .
3 J
Therefore in summarizing the discussion the reader should
note the importance of the dual variables as discussed to
yield an intuitive feeling for the worth of the combat units
in a dynamic situation. Certainly this is the case in the
real world, that a loss of troops early in the battle
(assuming no replacements are allowed) is a greater loss to
the commander since that soldier is lost for a greater length
of time. Besides the loss of the soldier there is an added
loss of the casualty inflicting power that soldier would have
yielded over the remainder of the battle. It was further shown
that his theory of duality used here further manifests itself
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Several models of the problem of target selection for field artillery
fire as a supporting weapon system to a maneuver element in a division
field environment are presented in this thesis. The field artillery
system, its capabilities and limitations, as well as, the criteria
utilized by military decision makers to provide timely, accurate,
and effective artillery fire support to the maneuver commander, is
covered to familiarize the analyst with the system to be modeled.
A differential equation model using Lanchester Theory of Combat and
the mathematical technique of optimal control to the target allocation
problem is presented. A second model presented uses an allocation of
fire dependent upon the kill potential and capability of the respec-
tive forces. The kill potential varies with the lethality and range
of the weapon system from that force. A discussion of the worth of
combat units in dynamic combat situations is also presented. The
conclusion reached is that there is a dire need for more models in the
area of target allocation that can clearly depict reality and still
maintain a certain mathematical tractability
.
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